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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]
Case No. 970296-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
i

vs.

Priority No. 2

LEIKINA LAVULAVU,
Defendant and Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE QF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction by a jury of
Manslaughter in a School Zone, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann., Section 76-3-203.2 (Supp. 1994). A copy of the
statute is attached as Addendum A.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann., Section 78-2-3 (2) (j). (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The Defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied
the Defendant's motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained
from the traffic stop of the vehicle the Defendant was driving
during the early morning of the shooting on August 25, 1996. The
Court "review[s] the factual findings underlying the trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a
clearly erroneous standard." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4
(Utah 1994)

(quoting State v. Brown. 853 P.2d.

851, 854

(Utah

1992)). Specifically, "whether a specific set of facts gives rise
to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable
1

nondeferentially

for

correctness

.

.

.

[with]

a

measure

of

discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a
given set of facts." IsL. at 939 (R. 48-58, 208-16).
Secondly, the trial court committed error in holding that the
subsequent search of the vehicle was proper. As with all issues
raised by a motion to suppress, a review of the factual issues
underlying the trial court's decision are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d

1182, 1186

(Utah

1995). The trial court's legal conclusions based upon those facts
are

reviewed

for

correctness,

according

the

trial

court's

conclusions no deference. State v. Yates, 918 P. 2d 136, 138) .
(R. 48-58, 208-16).
Third, the court committed error in admitting the statements
attributed to the co-defendant Beau Heaps in the trial of the
Defendant.

Additionally,

the

trial

court

committed

error

in

refusing to admit evidence relevant to the violent character of the
victim. Generally, a court is granted broad discretion

in its

decision to admit or exclude evidence. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
938.

The

Court

reviews

evidentiary

matters

on

an

"abuse

of

discretion" basis. State v. Casias. 772 P. 2d 975, 977 (Utah App.
1989). Legal determinations accompanying an interpretation of the
rules

of

evidence

are

reviewed

under

a

correction

of

error

standard. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993) (R. 199203, 203-4).
Fourth, based upon the Defendant's inability to converse and
understand English, the trial court committed error in holding that
2

the Defendant had waived his Miranda rights and accordingly, the
Defendant's statement to police was admissible. The appellate court
reviews a trial court's legal conclusion of a valid waiver of his
Miranda rights for correctness. However, the standard of review
grants a measure of discretion to the trial court because of the
variability of the factual settings, which are reversed only if
clearly erroneous. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994);
StatR v. Leyva. 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (Utah 1997) (R. 51-53).
Fifth, the evidence submitted to the jury in this case was not
sufficient to sustain the jury verdict. In reviewing a claim of
insufficiency

of

the

evidence,

the

appellate

court

views

the

evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in a light
most favorable to the verdict. State v. Wood, 868 P. 2d 70, 87 (Utah
1993) .

'
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES

Any

relevant

text

of

constitutional,

statutory,

or

rule

provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body or the appendix of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Leikina Lavulavu was charged by Information with
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.,
Section 76-5-203

(Supp. 1996). The Information alleged that the

Defendant together with the co-defendant, Beau Heaps, on August 25,
1996, "intentionally or knowingly caused the death of John Frietag
or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or aided another
person to cause the death of John Frietag." The Information also
3

included reference to two enhancement penalties, one for the use of
a firearm and the second, based upon the use of a firearm within
1,000 feet of a school (R. 1-3).
The Defendant was bound over to District

Court after a

preliminary hearing held on October 22, 1996. During that hearing,
the Defendant's case was severed from the four co-defendants
charged in the Information (R. 34-39) .
Prior to the trial, Defendant filed several motions. The
Defendant filed a motion to suppress based upon an illegal stop and
search of a vehicle in which the Defendant was riding and the
improper interrogation of the Defendant without properly advising
him of his Miranda rights (R. 45-58). The Defendant also filed a
motion challenging the constitutionality of the enhancement statute
(R. 60-85) . Finally, the Defendant filed motions and responses as
to

the

inadmissibility

of

statements

allegedly

made

by co-

defendants and the admissibility of evidence relating to the
character and disposition of the victim (R. 196-203) . Following a
suppression hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion
to suppress addressing the issues of the legality of the traffic
stop, the subsequent search of the defendants and vehicle and the
sufficiency of the Miranda warnings given to the Defendant (R. 25865) .
The jury trial of the Defendant began on December 2, 1996 and
ended with a verdict on December 10, 1996. The jury found the
Defendant guilty of the lesser included charge of Manslaughter, in
a school zone(R. 412). On January 10, 1997, the trial court
4

sentenced the Defendant to be confined in the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate term of "five years for which could be fore life"
(R. 464-65, 473-74) .
The notice of appeal was filed on February 10, 1997 (R. 476).
Defendant appeals from his conviction and seeks a new trial
and directions concerning the admissibility of certain evidence and
testimony.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch

as

the

Defendant

claims

that

the

evidence

was

insufficient to support the jury verdict, the facts are recited in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Morgan.
865 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677
(Utah App. 1992; £££ State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) .
A.
1.

Events Prior to August 25, 1996.

Officer Darcey Simmons of the Orem Police Department

testified that he met with the victim, John Frietag on August 18,
1996, at the Frietag residence located at 363 East 450 North, Orem
Utah. At that time, Frietag played an answering machine tape for
the Officer that he had received on that day (Tr. 1059-60, Ex. 1) .
The tape contained threats but Mr. Frietag and Officer Simmons were
unable

to identify the individual making the calls, could not

identify a Tongan accent and could not link the Defendant to the
threats made on the tape (Tr. 1061) . Mr. Frietag called the Officer
later that day to tell him that he had received another call in
which threats were made (Tr. 1060) .

5

2.

Tiana Heard was an acquaintance of the co-defendant Beau

Heaps and at the time of trial, hated him. Ms. Heard only knew the
Defendant

as

occasionally
testified

one

of

bring

that

to

she

the

individuals

that

her

house

1061,

was

best

(Tr.

friends

Beau

Heaps

would

1066) . Ms.

Heard

with

Mr.

Frietag's

stepdaughter, Susan Rice, and considered Mr. Frietag as the only
father figure in her life. Accordingly, Tiana had been at the
Frietag residence frequently (Tr. 1061) . Susan Rice was the girl
friend

of

regarding

the

co-defendant

Beau

Heaps.

an occasion when the Frietag

Ms.

Heard

door was

testified

damaged

that

apparently was the source of friction between Heaps and Frietag
(Tr. 1061-62) . Ms. Heard testified that the co-defendant Beau Heaps
admitted to her, on or about August 11, 1996, that he had made the
threats to Mr. Frietag on the answering machine when he was drunk
(Tr. 1063, 1068, Ex. 1 ) . The court allowed Tiana to testify that
the Defendant talked to Mr. Frietag either when Mr. Frietag called
back after receiving the threatening message or when the Defendant
called him back directly. The conversation centered on whether Mr.
Frietag was a "narc" (Tr. 1064) . Tiana testified that she heard the
Defendant say that he would take care of "it" and testified that
she saw the Defendant with a gun in his pants, which she identified
as

the gun matched

testifies

that

John

to the shooting
Frietag,

(Tr. 1064, Ex.

two or

three

days

2 ) . Tiana

prior

to

the

shooting, changed his hair color because he was looking for a new
appearance and that
1067) . However,

Mr.

"he was scared of some things"
Frietag

told
6

his

close

friend

(Tr. 106 5,
Nancy

Ann

Bollschweiler that he was not afraid of Beau Heaps (Tr. 1234) .
Tiana testified that Frietag was not violent

(Tr. 1066) , but

acknowledged that he used marijuana almost every day (Tr. 1067) . In
fact, Frietag provided marijuana to Ms. Heard (Tr. 1067) .
3.

On cross-examination, Tiana admitted that she had been

drinking the night the conversation with Beau Heaps and the
Defendant occurred regarding Mr. Frietag (Tr. 1068) . Further, she
admitted that LSD and marijuana was being used and that she was
sufficiently confused as to accuse others visiting her of stealing
her possessions when she ultimately discovered them where she had
placed them (Tr. 1068-69, 1478, 1519, 1582). Ms. Heard admitted
that the "bad blood" was between the co-defendant Beau Heaps and
John Frietag and that the Defendant was not involved (Tr. 1069).
Tiana

admitted

that

the

Defendant

made

no

threats

against

Mr. Frietag in the conversation he allegedly had with Mr. Frietag
and that the Defendant did not discuss the conversation with her.
Further Tiana admitted that at preliminary hearing, she could not
remember anything about threats made by the Defendant (Tr. 106970). She admitted that when she saw the gun in the Defendant's
possession, she only saw a centimeter and one-half of the gun
(Tr. 1070). Finally, Tiana admitted that she tried to get the codefendant Beau Heaps and the Defendant to beat up her ex-husband
but that the crime never occurred (Tr. 1070).
4.

Tracy Todd Price testified that he was a friend of the

Defendant and Mr. Frietag and that he saw the gun linked to the
shooting in the possession of the Defendant and another gun in the
7

possession of the co-defendant Beau Heaps several nights before the
shooting at a party (Tr. 1071, 1073). Price acknowledged that he
was drunk that night and that the gun, from several feet away, only
appeared to be the same gun (Tr. 1073, Ex. 2) . Price testified that
during the early morning hours after the party had ended, he was
being taken home because of his intoxication and that he saw the
Defendant

fire six shoots from the gun at parked vehicles. He

testified that another individual, Bo Molupo then took the gun,
reloaded it and shot at more parked cars (Tr. 1072-4) . The firing
of the gun was denied by Bo Molupo and the defendant Niemeitolu
(Tr.

1474, 1513). There were no police reports of shooting or

broken windows between the times and at the location testified to
by Price (Tr. 1523). Price testified that Mr. Frietag played the
telephone threat he had received from the answering machine and
that he recognized the voice as that of Beau Heaps
Price

acknowledged

that

Frietag

drank

and

used

(Tr. 1072) .
marijuana

(Tr. 1072).
5.

Margaret Ann Shepard testified that she knew the co-

defendant Beau Heaps and had been romantically involved with him
(Tr.

1075) . She testified that she saw Heaps and the Defendant

together three days before the incident and that once, while riding
in a vehicle and once, when they had arrived at their destination,
the co-defendant Beau Heaps said that he was going to kill Susan's
father, Mr. Frietag. Ms. Shepard acknowledged that the Defendant
was not part of the conversation and made no comment regarding the
statements made by Heaps

(Tr. 1075-6). Ms. Shepard acknowledged
8

that in the three weeks, prior to the incident, that she had known
of the Defendant, he never commented about Mr. Frietag made any
threats concerning him (Tr. 1077). Ms. Shepard also testified that
the Defendant

had a difficult

time speaking

and

understanding

English. In fact, the individuals that knew him recognized that
Tongan was the language that the Defendant most often spoke. At the
time of the traffic stop, when the Defendant was apprehended, the
Defendant had misunderstood a police command to walk backward and
had walked forward (Tr. 1078, 1421-22, 1425-26, 1518, 1582) .
6.

Todd L. Huffman and his wife, Donna Huffman, testified

that they were neighbors of Frietag and that on week prior to the
shooting,

they

had

a

conversation

with

Frietag

in

which

he

indicated that his daughter had received a threatening letter and
that some of her friends, Tongans and a white male were dangerous
and making threats (Tr. 1117-18, 1190-20). Frietag indicated that
he was working with the Narcotics Enforcement Team, that they were
going to provide him with a bulletproof vest and that they wanted
him to lure the individuals to catch them with drugs (Tr. 1120) .
The Thursday before the shooting, Mrs. Huffman

testified

that

Mr. Frietag indicated that he was meeting with the "main guy" and
that the problem was resolved (Tr. 1122). Frietag told his friend
Nancy Ann Bollschweiler that his problem was with the co-defendant
Beau Heaps over the broken door to his apartment (Tr. 123 0-31) .
7.

Susan Rice testified

that Mr. Frietag was her mom's

boyfriend for years but she had no biological relationship with him
(Tr. 1565) . She testified that she dated the defendant Beau Heaps
9

and that he and John Frietag were friends initially during 1994 and
1995.

In 1996, Beau would go to the house to see Mr. Frietag

without Susan and drink

(Tr. 1566-67) . Susan related

that

the

friction between the two was over the broken glass door during the
summer of 1996 (Tr. 1567). Susan indicated that she never heard of
any letter in which a threat to rape and kill her was made as
Frietag had stated to neighbors

(Tr. 1567). Susan testified to

Mr. Frietag1s use of marijuana, alcohol and cocaine on a frequent
basis (Tr. 1568) . She described, at the time of the shooting, mood
swings that Mr. Frietag was experiencing that caused him to be
paranoid

(Tr. 1568) . Susan also testified that Mr. Frietag and

Nancy Bollschweiler were romantically involved and that she had
walked in on them in March of 1996 (Tr. 1568). Susan testified to
threats of violence

that Mr. Frietag made

to defendant

Heaps

(Tr. 1570-72) and that Frietag was not afraid of Heaps (Tr. 1572).
8.

Susan McKeown, Susan's mother and John Frietag's girl

friend from 1993 to 1996 confirmed the presence of mood swings when
Mr. Frietag was doing drugs (Tr. 1573). She reported significant
paranoia on his part when he would imagine stories in his head and
then believe them to be true (Tr. 1573, 1575). Further Ms. McKeown
confirmed that when John was doing drugs and alcohol, he was most
violent (Tr. 1574-5) . At the time that Susan moved out, Mr. Frietag
was depressed, curled up on a couch and crying (Tr. 1575) .
9.

Kimberly Nilsson was married to John Frietag from 1989 to

1993 (Tr. 1659-60). She testified to a series of violent acts by
Mr. Frietag that were sometimes accompanied by drinking (Tr. 166010

62, 1664-70) . She also testified as to Mr. Frietag's use of illegal
drugs (Tr. 1662-64) .
10.

The Defendant's relative and religious leader testified

that he had problems with comprehension in school. Lekina had
problems retaining even simple information such as forgetting only
two items he was sent to the store to purchase (Tr. 1586-87) . They
testified that the Defendant was religious, nonviolent, excellent
with kids and kind (Tr. 1585-89, 1600-04).
B.
11.

Events of August 25, 1996.

Anthony Tai, one of the seven individuals charged in the

matter testified that he did not know John Frietag (Tr. 1387-88) .
Tai testified that he had seen the Defendant with a gun days
earlier with other defendants who had guns but was unsure if it was
the gun linked to the shooting (Tr. 1426-27) . He testified that all
of the defendants charged in the matter including Leikina Lavulavu
were originally at the Branbury Apartments in Provo, Utah during
the

evening

of

Saturday,

August

24,

1996.

Thereafter

the

defendants, during the early morning hours of Sunday, August 25,
1996, went to a home occupied by Apasi, where they partied and
consumed

significant

amounts

of

beer

(Tr. 1388-90) . Anthony

testified that he had a case or two of beer to drink himself, was
"pretty drunk" and had a "dim" memory of the night
1422).

Anthony

testified

that

the

co-defendant

(Tr. 13 96,
Beau

Heaps

apparently made a phone call from that residence that angered the
Defendant Kina Lavulavu who was yelling at Heaps for making the
call. Subsequently, a phone call came in and was answered by coll

defendant Tonga Mounga who passed the phone to defendant, David
Niumeitolu. The individuals did not appear to be angry when they
were talking on the phone, but Anthony testified that after the
phone

call,

the

Defendant's car

seven

individuals

got

up

and

got

into

the

(Tr. 1390-93, 1424). At the time the phone call

came in, the Defendant was playing the guitar (Tr. 1422).
12.
Defendant

The Defendant, Tai and Nua Unga, testified
was

driving

the vehicle

but

he

saw

no

that

gun

in

the
the

Defendants possession (Tr. 1393, 1581). Anthony testified that he
remembers no conversation in the car but thought they were going to
meet a girl (Tr. 1398, 14232). When they arrived in the area of the
Frietag apartment, Anthony Tai testified that everyone exited the
vehicle, except Niua Unga, and he followed them, walking, to the
Frietag apartment during which time no threats were being made. He
testified that he walked up to the door, as instructed by Beau
Heaps, while three of the individuals went around the left side of
the unit. The co-defendant Beau Heaps was hiding behind a car
(Tr. 1400-03, 1424, Ex. 5) . The Defendant was back on the grass
area (Tr. 1410) . Anthony was told by Heaps that he knew the guy at
the apartment where the girl lived and, accordingly Anthony opened
the screen door, rang the door bell and Frietag opened the door
with his hands to his side, tensed. Anthony, after being coached by
someone, asked if Susan was there and was told by Frietag that
Susan was not home (Tr. 1404-07, 1429, Ex. 7, 9, 34).
13.

At that juncture, Bo Malupo, David Niemeitolu and Tonga

Mounga, the three individuals that had gone around the house,
12

joined him at the front door (Tr. 1407-08) The Defendant Bo Malupo
then said, "He's got a gun." Anthony, believing that Frietag could
have had a gun and afraid, closed the screen door and walked away
past

the Defendant

and Beau Heaps, leaving

the other

three

individuals at the door (Tr. 1409-10, 1418-20, 1428-29) . Anthony
then heard the Defendant say, "should I shoot him?" and a shot was
fired from behind him (Tr. 1411-13). Anthony testified that he did
not hear any conversation that existed on the Frietag tape about
"cops" and does not know what Frietag did after he turned around
(Tr. 1418) . The individuals than returned to the car and drove away
(Tr. 1413-14) . Until the defendants were stopped Anthony testified
that he did not see a gun or hear any conversation about a gun (Tr.
1415) .
14.

I
The defendant Bo Malupo, who had a case of beer to drink

that night, the defendant, Tonga Mounga, who had a twelve pack to
drink, defendant David Niumeitolu, who had two drinks, and Nua Unga
confirmed the defendants' presence at a party outside of the
Apasi's apartment during the early morning of August 25 at which
the defendants were drinking and singing (Tr. 1436-37, 1441, 148384, 1502, 1580) . Malupo testified that the Defendant was not a big
drinker and had the least to drink that night (Tr. 1476). Mounga
and Niumeitolu testified that he saw defendant Beau Heaps make a
phone call that lasted minutes (Tr. 1484, 1503) They testified that
he saw the defendant Beau Heaps answer the phone shortly before
leaving the area and then hand the phone to defendant Tonga Mounga
and defendant David Niumeitolu, where expletives were exchanged and
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threats made by Frietag (Tr. 1438-39, 1484-85, 1503). Malupo and
Niumeitolu testified that they talked to a person whom they didn't
know but was presumably Frietag who called them names and that
during the conversation the defendant Beau Heaps kept saying the
guy--Frietag--was
methamphetamine

a
(Tr.

psycho
1475,

and
1503,

a

"tweeker"--a

1514).

They

person

confirmed

on
that

defendant Bo Heaps led the procession to the vehicle to go to the
Frietag residence to party and straighten matters out with Frietag
and that the Defendant, Lavulavu was mad that Heaps had called him
because he was afraid of Frietag. The defendants loaded the beer
into coolers and into the Lavulavu vehicle because that was the
only ride they had

(Tr. 1440, 1475-76, 1485-86, 1503) . The only

comment about Frietag was made by the defendant Beau Heaps who
asked if anyone anted to go over and "kick his ass" (Tr. 1581) . No
comments were made about shooting or hurting Mr. Frietag by any
other defendants. In fact, the Defendant Lavulavu did not want to
go. After arriving near the Frietag apartment, because they had
missed
talking

the

turn off, both confirmed

loudly,

not

trying

that

to conceal

the defendants

themselves

and

were

walking

casually. He stated that the defendant Unga stopped by a tree, that
he,

David Niemeitolu and Tonga Mounga went to the side of the

house, Tony Tai was located in front of the door, Heaps was behind
a vehicle and the Defendant was standing beyond the step to the
apartment. The Defendant Tai approached the door (Tr. 1444-5, 1453,
1476, 1480, 1486, 1489-90, 1498, 1504, 1510, 1515, Ex. 5, 6, 9, 10,
35) .
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15.

The defendants heard someone ask, if Susan was there and

he, David Niemeitolu and Tonga Mounga joined the Defendant below
the porch, approximately four to six feet from the door. At that
time, the screen door was open and the main front door was also
open

(Tr. 1446-47, 1473, 1490, 1500, 1505, 1517 Ex. 6 ) . They

confirmed that as he was approaching the door that they saw a
reflection of a gun in Frietag's hand and that Malupo told the
other

individuals

twice. Mounga confirmed

that he saw

Frietag

hiding something in his hand against the wall that appeared to be
a gun (Tr. 1448-50, 1491, 1505, 1515 Exhibit 6 ) . Malupo confirmed
that the reflection could have been the crossbow.
Exhibit

13) . Mounga

and Malupo reacted

(Tr. 144 9-50,

to the observation

by

running away (Tr. 1450-52, 1492, Ex. 13) . As he was running, Malupo
testified that he saw the Defendant Lavulavu's hand outstretched,
pointed away from Frietag and the front door, but did not see a gun
but then heard a shot (Tr. 1452-53, 1472-3, Ex. 6, 7 9, 43). Malupo
did not know where the defendant Beau Heaps or other defendants
were located at the time the shot was fired (Tr. 1452-53) . In a
statement given to police after he was arrested Malupo stated that
the Defendant had a gun at the scene and after returning to the car
said that what happened was "just between us." The other defendants
remember no conversation (Tr. 1458-65, 1508). On cross-examination,
Malupo stated that he neither saw the Defendant with a gun on the
night of the shooting nor heard any threats (Tr. 1472) . He only saw
the gun in the trunk of the Defendants car when he opened the
trunk of the vehicle earlier that night
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(Tr. 1472, Ex. 2) . The

defendant Niemeitolu testified that he saw the Defendant Lavulavu
pull a gun from his right side and four seconds later, heard a shot
(Tr. 1506-7). In a statement to police, Niemeitolu testified that
the Defendant walked to the door, after hearing that Frietag had a
gun and

said

"want me to shoot him"

twice and

then

shot

him

(Tr. 1508-09, 1515).
16.

David

Richard

Allman

and

his

wife

Dixie

Lee

Allman

testified that they resided at 395 East 400 North in Orem, Utah
County, Utah and that during the early morning hours of August 25,
1996, they saw a small white car pull up in front of his house and
five or six individuals with dark hair and dark complexion exit the
vehicle and head north on 400 East. The individuals were loud and
not attempting to conceal their activities (Tr. 1094-95, 1098-99,
1101, Ex. 4, 5 ) . As the individuals passed, Allmans testified that
they heard someone say, "That mother f--er doesn't know who he is
dealing with"

(Tr. 1095, 1099).

Fearing that their might be a

fight, Mr. Allman called 911. After approximately a fifteen-second
conversation, Allman walked outside and shortly thereafter, heard
a shot from the North. Allman then had his wife call 911 again and
report

the shot to police

(Tr. 1095-96) . Allman reported

that

shortly thereafter, he saw the same individuals walk back to the
car and head West along 400 North. Mrs. Allman testified she saw
them head East after returning to the vehicle
Ex.

5 ) . Mrs. Allman

testified

that

she

went

(Tr. 1096, 1100,
to

the

Frietag

residence with an officer and saw Mr. Frietag's body, with his feet
outside of the entrance to the apartment (Tr. 1102) .
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17.

Rodney Allen Brerton testified that he lived in the

adjoining duplex to Mr. Frietag and that at the time of the
shooting, between 12:00 and 1:00, he was watching television with
Nancy Bollschweiler (Tr. 1103-4, 1196). Mr. Brerton heard yelling
and what seemed to be an altercation. Both he and Nancy testified
that they could identify Tongans from the accent of the individuals
(Tr. 1199). Mr. Brerton looked out his window and saw one standing
behind Mr. Frietag's car crouched down with something in his hand.
Brerton thought it was a beer can but could not be sure. He heard
the gunshot and then saw a group of six individuals, nonwhites,
standing at the end of Mr. Frietag's driveway and heard one of the
individuals say, "He doesn't know who the fuck he's messing with."
The argument continued both before and after the shooting (Tr.
1104-6, 1110-12, 1115, 1119, Ex. 6-9). Brerton testified that when
he went to investigate, the lower glass portion of the storm door
to the Frietag residence was shattered and the main door closed.
Brerton and Nancy then entered the residence through the garage
after hearing Mr. Frietag call for help (Tr. 1106-8, 1203, Ex. 1114). Rodney and Nancy saw a crossbow with an arrow lying next to
Mr. Frietag (Tr. 1007-8, 1114, 1209).
18.

The Huff mans testified that they were awakened at the

time of the shooting by voices, what seemed like an interchange
between two people and then they heard he shot (Tr. 1118, 1123) .
19.

Counsel for the Defendant proffered that witnesses would

testify that Mr. Frietag had been off medication and was acting
bizarrely. Specifically, that because of a chemical imbalance
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caused by the medication and the use of marijuana and alcohol, he
would dress up like a woman and that his abilities to control his
emotions and aggressiveness were seriously influenced. Counsel for
the Defendant proffered that the evidence demonstrated that at the
time of death, Mr. Frietag's public hair had been dyed, that he had
shaved his legs, that he was wearing women's bikini-thong underwear
and women's jewelry indicating that Mr. Frietag was having mental
difficulties

(Tr.1126-28). Additionally,

the

defense

proffered

expert testimony, based upon the records of Mr. Frietag that he had
engaged

in a life of serious drug and alcohol abuse and that

withdrawal

from

those drugs

could

cause depression,

violence,

paranoia and other mental problems (Tr. 1629-58). The trial court
refused to allow the admission of the evidence (Tr. 1128, 1524-25,
1578-80, 1657-58, Exhibit 47, 48).
C.
20.

Investigation of the Shooting.

Officer Gary Downing, a detective sergeant with the Orem

Police Department was the lead investigator on the case against the
Defendant

(Tr. 1129). The officer recovered a cassette tape from

the Frietag answering machine that recorded approximately fifteen
minutes prior to the encounter, the events surrounding the shooting
and,

the

aftermath.

(Tr.

1129-30,

Ex.

15,

17) . The

officer

testified that a thud was heard on the tape prior to the door bell
ringing (which thud the officer attributes to Frietag firing his
cross bow at the closet door) (Tr. 1130, 1133, 1135, Ex. 16). The
officer testified that there were a number of holes in the door
(some penetrating the entire door) that matched the circumference
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of the dart from the cross bow, which the officer characterized as
a deadly weapon (Tr. 1133-34, Ex. 17) . The officer acknowledged
that the Frietag house was not completely searched and that it was
left unattended overnight (Tr. 1134-36, 1137-38). The officer noted
that there were .22 shells on the floor of the apartment where
Mr. Frietag was located but no darts in the door when it was
retrieved as evidence (Tr. 1127, 1135).
21.

Officer Downing testified that the tape demonstrated that

before Mr. Frietag said that the "cops were on their way," there
was no yelling or raised voices (Tr. 1136) . Thereafter the shot was
heard and then the voice of the neighbor Nancy, as she attended to
the victim (Tr. 1136) .
22.

Officer Harold Young testified that he was the first

officer at the scene (Tr. 1138-9). The officer testified contrary
to other witnesses that the front door, behind the broken screen
door was open when he arrived (Tr. 114 0). The officer did observe
the crossbow at Mr. Frietagfs feet, .22 bullets in his left hand
and around his body and crossbow arrows (Tr. 114 0-42). Further,
although a log was kept as to the persons at the scene, there were
inaccuracies in the log (Tr. 1144-45) . Nancy Ann Bollschweiler
testified that the crossbow had been moved from when she discovered
it upon entering the apartment (Tr. 1247).
23.

Officer Jay Fletcher gathered evidence from the scene and

took photographs

(Tr. 1150-51) . The officer found no beer cans

between the automobiles in the driveway (Tr. 1154) . The officer
acknowledged that the holes in the door of the Frietag residence
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matched the arrows from the crossbow fired by Frietag. Further, the
condition of the crossbow was that of the weapon after it had been
fired (Tr. 1156-59) . Although a firearm was not found, the officers
did only a cursory search of the residence (Tr. 1158) . The officer
did find prescription bottles in Mr. Frietag's name
Contrary

to what Mr. Frietag

had

told

neighbors,

(Tr. 1158).
the

officer

testified that it would be unusual for the police to give a private
citizen a bullet proof vest and ask someone to lure criminals to
his house (Tr. 1160) . In fact, Mr. Frietag was not aligned with NET
or other law enforcement agency prior to his death, although he
told his neighbors and close friends that he was. Additionally, no
letter

threatening

his

stepdaughter

was

ever

given

to

police

(Tr. 1231-32, 1612-20) .
24.

Nancy Ann Bollschweiler testified that she had been a

friend and neighbor of Mr. Frietag for over a year (Tr. 1188-89) .
She testified that she knew that Mr. Frietag had purchased the
crossbow six or seven months before the shooting and had practiced
firing the same with his children into the door to the linen closet
(Tr. 1189-90) . Nancy testified that Mr. Frietag was on prescription
medication for a mental condition (Tr. 1223). She testified that
Mr. Frietag suffered from anxiety attacks that could cause him to
be afraid. In fact she actually observed him having an anxiety
attach during 1996 (Tr. 1226-28).
25.

Edward

Leis,

from

the

Utah

State

Examiner's

Office

testified that he did an autopsy on Mr. Frietag and discovered a
gunshot wound in the abdomen (Tr. 1259), needle marks in the flex
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point of the right arm (Tr. 1260) , evidence of marijuana use in the
urine (consistent with usage 24-48 hours prior to death) (Tr. 126061, 1281), a blood-alcohol level of .09 taken from fluid in the eye
and .06 in the blood (Tr. 1261, 1282). The doctor testified that
the bullet had irregularities consistent both with being deflected
prior to entry and not being deflected (Tr. 1272, 1292) . The doctor
testified that the bullet perforated the stomach, struck the aorta
and hit a portion of the backbone (Tr. 1272-75). The bullet bit the
back two or three inches lower than the entrance wound (Tr. 1285) .
The doctor could not calculate

the height of the gun without

knowing whether the victim was standing straight up or crouched at
the time of penetration (Tr. 1293-1296). The doctor testified to
the

presence

of

earrings,

(Tr. 1298) . No gunshot

paint

on

his

hands

and

tattoos

residue test was done of the

decedent

(Tr. 1324-25).
26.

The testimony of Officer Barry Nielsen was proffered that

he received a call to respond to a suspicious vehicle and while
following one car traveling on 400 North, spotted another car
coming toward him on 400 North that was white and followed it and
eventually initiated a traffic stop (Tr. 1328-29).
27.

Officers Gordon Christensen and Eric Beveridge testified

they got a call from dispatch of a suspicious vehicle in the area
of 395 East 400 North in Orem, with numerous occupants getting out
and walking away (Tr. 1331, 1373). They testified that subsequently
dispatch told them that shots had been fired in the area where the
occupants had exited the vehicle (Tr. 1332, 1373). At that time,
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Barry Nielsen radioed that he was following a car that matched the
description

of

being

a

white

passenger

car

with

four

doors

(Tr. 1335). Officer Christensen testified that he also heard that
there were five dark-complexioned male occupants. (Tr. 1335-36). A
subsequent review of the dispatch tape revealed that there was no
mention
28.

of

dark-skinned

people

in the

vehicle

(Tr.

1363-66) .

The officers instructed the occupants to exit the vehicle

and the Defendant, who was driving, exited the vehicle. The vehicle
was registered to Mr. Lavulavu's family (Tr. 1339-41, 1375). The
occupants were handcuffed as they exited (Tr. 1384) . The Defendant
was

completely

cooperative

with

the

officers

(Tr. 1368) . The

officers thereupon searched the car and found a steak knife, tire
iron, a BB gun under the front seat and a wood handled .38 caliber
gun, located halfway under the seat on the driver's side (Tr. 134849, 1361, 1379-80) . The officer determined that the .38 caliber gun
had one spent cartridge and two live cartridges (Tr. 1350-51, 1356,
1380) . The co-defendant Beau Heaps was sitting in the back seat of.
the vehicle (Tr. 1377).
29.

Robert W. Brinkman, a criminalist, testified

that he

found no gunshot residue from the samples taken from the Defendant
after he was arrested and that the samples taken from the codefendant Beau Heaps were positive for two particles (Tr. 1531) .
Brinkman than analyzed the four pockets of the pants worn by the
Defendant and Heaps and found particles characteristic of gunshot
residue in the left front and left rear pockets of the Defendant,
Lavulavu and none from the pockets of Heaps
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(Tr. 1531-32) . No

residue was found on the exterior of the Defendant's shirt or pants
(Tr. 1541) . The existence of residue means that the person fired a
weapon or was near someone who had

(Tr. 153 2) . Inasmuch as the

residue was found inside the left pant pockets of the Defendant
Lavulavu, where gunshot residue would be slow to dissipate, it is
impossible to tell when the residue was deposited (Tr. 1542).
30.

Brinkman testified that the gun identified during the

trial (Ex.2) is consistent with the gun that fired the bullet found
in

Mr.

Frietag's

body

(Tr.

1533-34,

1542,

Ex.30).

Brinkman

testified that the screen door to the Frietag apartment had been
shattered by a medium velocity object, consistent with a handgun
(Tr.

1535-36, Exhibit 11) . Additionally, he testified that the

screen door was partially open when it was shattered

(Tr., 1537,

1543, Ex. 29, 34) .
31.

Terry Routt, an employee of the Wasatch Mental Health

organization testified that he visited John Frietag three to four
times from the fall of 1995 to the spring of 1996 and on each
occasion, when Mr. Routt approached the residence, Mr. Frietag
would look out the window and identify who was there before opening
the door (Tr. 1563).
32.

Allen Sunday from Easy Pawn testified

that he had a

Winchester 9034, 30-30 rifle belonging to Mr. Frietag from August
3, 1996 (Ex. 51, Tr. 1564-65).
33.

The trial court allowed the confession of the Defendant

into evidence. In the statement, the Defendant stated that he did
not really know Mr. Frietag, that Mr. Frietag had threatened him on
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the telephone by telling him to watch his back. The Defendant
stated that Beau Heaps was the individual that was the motivating
force to go to the Frietag residence. The Defendant stated that
Heaps asked for the gun when they arrived at the Frietag residence.
The Defendant admitted shooting Mr. Frietag, after asking "should
I shoot" twice. The Defendant testified that the co-defendants Beau
Heaps, Bo Malupo and Tonga Mounga told him to shoot

(Tr. 1522,

Ex. 27).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
pQINT I, The trial court committed error in ruling that the
Orem

City Officers had an articulable

reasonable

suspicion

to

support the traffic stop of the vehicle the Defendant was driving
during the morning hours after the shooting.
POINT

II. The

ruling

of

the

trial

court

in denying

the

Defendant's motion to suppress, that the officers were justified in
searching the vehicle the Defendant was driving, after he had been
apprehended and cuffed constituted error.
POINT III, The trial court abused its discretion and committed
error in admitting statements attributed to the co-defendant Beau
Heaps

during

the

trial

of

the

Defendant.

In

admitting

the

statements, the trial court ignored the principles established in
Bruton and the Utah Rules of Evidence relating to the admission of
evidence that is clearly prejudicial. Additionally, the trial court
abused

its discretion with regard to evidence relating

violent character of the victim.
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to the

POINT

IV.

The

court

committed

error

in holding

that

the

Defendant had waived his Miranda rights and given a voluntary and
knowing confession. Accordingly, the admission of the confession
was the Defendant was error.
POINT V, The evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict in the matter and accordingly, the verdict and the judgment
of the lower court should be set aside.

ARgPMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FROM THE ILLEGAL
STOP OF THE VEHICLE THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING.
A.

Summary of Facts.

The trial court's Ruling denying the Defendant's motion to
suppress is contained in the Addendum as Exhibit "B." The facts
found by the trial court that relate to the motion to suppress
comprise the first eight numbered paragraphs which are set out for
convenience:
1.
On August 25, 1996 at approximately 1:06 a.m., Orem
dispatch received a call from a citizen who reported five
or six dark complected males had parked a white sedan in
front of his house at 395 E. 400 North Orem, and were
"bailing out." Based upon their manner and the
conversation he overheard, the citizen was afraid there
was going to be a fight.
2.
Approximately two minutes later, another call was
received from the same residence indicating shots had
been fired. While on the line with dispatch, the caller
saw the males get back in the car and leave westbound on
400 North. The caller reported that another person at the
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house had heard the males say "That mother fucker doesn't
know who he's dealing with" prior to getting back into
the vehicle.
3.
Officers were given a description of the vehicle and
the passengers, a "white passenger car" carrying five or
six "dark-skinned males."
4.
Officer Barry Nielsen was northbound on State
Street, south of 400 North. He saw a car come from 400
North and turn northbound on State Street. He could not
identify if the vehicle matched the description given by
dispatch, so he followed it on State Street. When he
passed 400 North, he looked eastbound and saw only one
pair of headlights traveling westbound on 400 North
towards State Street.
5.
As Officer Nielsen approached the vehicle northbound
on State Street, he observed that it was a dark colored
passenger car. In his rearview mirror, he saw the other
car westbound on 400 North turn south on State Street and
observed that it was a white passenger car. He turned his
vehicle around and followed the car now southbound on
State Street.
6.
Officer Nielsen continued to follow the white car as
it turned westbound on Center Street. Prior to reaching
4 00 West, he was able to determine that there were
several male occupants in the vehicle. He and other
officers initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle at the
intersection of Center Street and 400 West.
7.
The officers removed the occupants of the vehicle
and placed them in handcuffs. The occupants were informed
that an individual had been shot in the area they had
just left and a car matching the description of their car
was scene [sic] driving away.
8.
Officers Gordon Christensen and Eric Beveridge
searched the vehicle and located a .38 caliber revolver
from under the drivers' seat, which was where the
Defendant was sitting when the vehicle was stopped. The
officers also located a steak knife, tire iron, and a BB
gun in the vehicle.

The trial court held that under the totality of circumstances
test, a reasonable articulable suspicion existed that the Defendant
had committed a crime, thus justifying the traffic stop (R. 26226

63) . The trial court based its ruling on the following facts.
First, the call to dispatch from a citizen that five or six dark
complected had exited a car near their residence, together with the
consideration of the time of occurrence and the statement allegedly
made by the individuals. Second, the follow-up call to dispatch
indicating that a shot was heard, the five or six

individuals

returning to the car and the statement allegedly made at that time.
Third, the officers observing a vehicle with occupants that matched
the description and the lack of other traffic exiting the area
where the shot was fired (R. 262-63)
B.

Law As Applied to the Pacts.
I.

The

Fourth

The
Stop
of
the
Defendant's
Vehicle
Constituted a Seizure Under the Utah and
United States Constitutions.
Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution

guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses,

papers,

and

effects,

against

unreasonable

search

and

seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. A similar right is contained in
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. It follows that
"people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they
step

from

their homes onto the public

sidewalk."

Delaware

v.

Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1970) (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1
(1968)). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that "whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry, supra at 16. A person is
deemed seized "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and
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the resulting detention quite brief.11 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979).
{S]topping
constitute

a

an

automobile

"seizure" within

and

detaining

the meaning of

its

occupants

[the Fourth

and

Fourteenth] Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention quite brief." State v. Case.
884 P.2d

1274, 1276

(Utah Ct. App. 1994)

Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 653
There

is

no

(quoting Delaware v.

(1979)).

question

that

the

officers'

command

to

the

Defendant, the driver of the vehicle in this case constituted a
seizure under both the Utah and United States Constitution.
II.

The Requirements of a Constitutional Seizure.

The United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah
prohibit unreasonable seizures. A limited crime investigation stop,
as defined by Terry v. Ohio, and its progeny may be determined to
be constitutionally reasonable only after a court makes a dual
inquiry. First the police officer's action must be "justified at
its inception." Second, the resulting detention must be "reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justify the interference
in the first place" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968) .
There is no question that if an officer reasonably suspects a
person of violating

an applicable

traffic

regulation

or other

crime, the police officer may legally stop that person. State v.
Fiaueroa-Solorio. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Marshall/ 791 P.2d 880, 883 n. 3 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800
P.2d 1105

(Utah 1990); State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah
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App. 1990) . There is no question that the Defendant did not violate
any traffic laws.
Absent a violation of the traffic code, the only basis to
initiate a stop is based upon Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 (1982 as
Amended), which provides:
A police officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
Id. £££ al&£

State v. Menke. 787 P.2d 537, 541

(Utah Ct. App.

1990). £££, Stat'g v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994).
Numerous Utah cases have dealt with the question of what
constitutes a reasonable suspicion, gee State v. Mendoza. 748 P. 2d
181 (Utah 1987); State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam); State v. Menke. .supra; State v. Sierra. 774 P.2d 972 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); gfrate v» Truiillo. 739 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1987).
In defining reasonable suspicion, the Courts have noted that:
While the required level of suspicion is lower than the
standard required for probable cause to arrest, the same
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to
determine
if there are sufficient
"specific
and
articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion. Id.t
Terry v. Ohio, SUPra at 19-20.
The facts supporting reasonable suspicion may come from the
officer's own observations as well as "information, bulletins, or
flyers received from other lav* enforcement sources. State v. Case.
251 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . The cases have required
that any suspicion be based upon ob-iective facta which indicate the
existence of criminal activity. State v. Talbot. 134 Utah Adv. Rep.

29

15,

17 (Utah App. 1990) . Second, "the officer must be able to

articulate what it is about those facts which leads to inference of
criminal activity." State v. Menke. supra at 541. If the officer is
unable

to

articulate

what

facts

and

inferences

led

to

his

suspicion, the suspicion is classified as a mere hunch and will not
justify the subsequent

stop. Id. See also. State v. Talbot.

Finally,
The facts [must] be judged against an objective standard:
Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of
the seizure or the search "warrant a [person] of
reasonable .caution in the belief" that the action taken
was appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing
more substantial than inarticulate hunches.

Trujiiio. supra at 88/ state v, Talbot/ supra; Terry vt QhiQ/
supra.
The

appellate

courts

have

indicated

that

under

certain

circumstances, police officers can rely on a dispatched report in
making a stop. A Terry stop made in objective reliance upon a flyer
or bulletin is proper "if the police who issued the flyer or
bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion .justifying a stop."
United States v. Hensely, 469 U.S. 221,223 (1985). As stated in
Case. "the legality of a stop based on information imparted by
another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts
known to the [officer] originating the information or bulletin
subsequently received and acted upon by the investigating officer."
Id. at 1277. However, the investigating officer need not be
actually

informed

of all the underlying
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facts known

to the

originating officer that establish reasonable suspicion XsL. at 1277
n.5. State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 649-51 (Utah 1989).
A review of the type of conduct that the Court has held
generally to constitute a reasonable suspicion is helpful. In State
v. Munsen, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. 1991), the Court held
that the failure of the defendant and her companion to explain the
ownership of a vehicle which was parked in a parking lot did not
rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.
Numerous cases have held that the mere fact that a person was
in the company of others with bad reputations does not necessarily
conjoin that persons' actions with the person of bad reputation. A
"person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable
cause to search that person." Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979). The Supreme Court held in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 5152 (1979), that mere presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug
users does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. In fact the
Supreme Court has noted that presumptions of guilt are not to be
made by mere meetings. United States v. Pi Re. 332 U.S. 581 (1948) .
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that no reasonable suspicion could
even be assumed where a man walking near the defendant had run
away. State v. Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 14 (Utah 1991) . The
Court held that traveling at what may seem a suspicious time in a
suspicious location alone is insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion. State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicium of criminal
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activity was truck driving on a public road late at night) . In
State v. Truiillo. 739 P. 2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Court
held that three individuals, who were walking along slowly, looking
into store windows, in a high-crime neighborhood, and who then
acted nervous at their initial encounter with officers did not
present sufficient facts to justify the formation of a reasonable
suspicion.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that circumstances such as a
car stopped during early morning hours on a highway was of "little
relevance." State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183-84 (Utah 1987). In
State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986), the Court held
that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle withoutout-of-state plates moving slowly through a frequently burglarized
neighborhood at 3:00 a.m. In State v. Struber 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 37
(Ut. Ct. App. 1997), the Court held that there were not sufficient
facts upon which the officer could form a reasonable suspicion when
the defendant backed up towards a construction area and signs that
read

"road closed." The Defendant

then parked his vehicle and

turned off his lights. The Court held that there were any number of
possible innocent explanations for the behavior and that the stop
was illegal. Id. at 39.
The Utah Appellate Courts have held that an officer may base
a

finding of reasonable

parties

only

if

the

suspicion upon

information

was

information

issued

on

the

from

third

basis

of

articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted
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person has committed an offense. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650
(Utah 1989) .
The Court thoroughly analyzed the issue in State v. Case. 251
Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . In that case an officer
received

a dispatch call directing him to a specific

area

to

investigate a possible car prowl or car burglary. The dispatcher
described

the

suspect

as

male

with

a

chunky

build,

possibly

Hispanic, wearing a white tee shirt. Subsequently, the officer
noticed a passenger in a vehicle which matched the description. The
officer stopped the vehicle for questioning. During the course of
the officers investigation, he detected the odor of alcohol and
arrested the defendant for driving under the influence.
The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the test set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971). The Court held,
. . . that an officer can make a valid arrest based on
such broadcast information only if the department issuing
the information had sufficient probable cause to support
the arrest warrant.
Id. at 568.
The Court in Case then concluded:
Consequently, if the investigating officer cannot provide
independent or corroborating information through his or
her own observations, the legality of a stop based on
information imparted by another will depend on the
sufficiency Q£ fckg articulable facts known to the
individual originating fcllS information or bulletin
subsequently received and acted upon by the investigating
pfficert
(Emphasis added.)
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Id. at 27. £££ alSQi State v. Steel. 827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
The

Court

found

that

the

information

transmitted

to

the

officer in Case was legally insufficient. The Court found that
simply reporting a car prowl, the location of the car prowl, and
information regarding the suspect was insufficient. Id. at 28. The
Court cont inued:
Merely providing descriptive information to an officer
about whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify
the stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to
which establish why a stop was to be made.
Id. at 28.
The Utah Court of Appeals re-examined the issue in Kaysville
City v. Mulcahy. 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In
that case the informant called police and reported that a "drunk
individual" had been at his front door and had driven away in a
white car, a Toyota Celica and had driven out of his subdivision
going East towards the mountains. The officer had a traffic stop
based upon the information provided. The Court held to the test in
Case and held that an officer can rely on a dispatched report if
there was adequate articulable suspicion that spurred the dispatch.
Id. at 18.
The Court held that to undertake the task, the court had an
obligation of probing the reliability of the informant's tip. The
first factor is the type of tip or informant involved. The Court
noted that anonymous tips are at the "low-end of the reliability
scale." State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The
Court held that citizen informants rank high on the reliability
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scale because such people ordinarily volunteer information based
upon concern for the community and can be held accountable civilly
or criminally, if the report is false. Id., at 20, State V. Brown,
798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
The second factor to be examined is whether the "informant
gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support
a stop." Id. . at 20, State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) . The Court noted:
A tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the
informant observed the details personally, instead of
simply relaying information from a third party.
Id. . at 20. The Court noted that there must be no hint of
fabrication. Id.
The third factor identified by the Court is whether the police
officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report of
the informant's tip. Id. The Court held that if the facts relating
to the identity of the vehicle, the direction of travel and other
details are confirmed, it is not necessary that the officer
corroborate the intoxication. However, the Court noted that such a
test applies in circumstances where the alleged intoxicated driver
is on the roads, potentially subjecting the public to harm. The
Court noted,
We therefore must consider the ever-changing equation
used to balance the rights of an individual to be free
from unwarranted intrusions of his or her freedom of
movement and the right to privacy with the right of the
public to be protected from unreasonable danger. This
equation and the balance change with the facts presented.
Id,, at 20.
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The Court last reviewed the matter in City of St. George v.
Carter, 325 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In that case,
the Court held that the report of an Arby's employee that a driveup customer had an open container of alcohol which included a
definitive

description

of

the

vehicle

with

license

plate

information and location was sufficient to constitute a reasonable
suspicion to make the traffic stop. Id. at 17. Applying the facts
of the case to the law, the Court found that there was a sufficient
basis for the stop.
III. The Facts of This Case Demonstrate the Seizure
was Illegal.
It is submitted that the facts of this case clearly indicate
that the officers did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion
based upon the information that they received from dispatch.
First, the Appellant does not question the right of the
officer to rely on the citizen phoning the information to dispatch
in that their identity was disclosed as required by the Court in
its previous decisions.
However, as to the second test, the officers clearly did not
have a right to effectuate a stop. There is no question that the
information disclosed to the officer must establish the existence
of criminal activity. The first phone call revealed that five or
six individuals exited a car from a public street and started
walking down a public sidewalk. The case law is clear that the
presence of a car or individuals in any area during the late
evening

hours

does

not

constitute
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reasonable

suspicion.

The

individuals, as detailed in the Statement of Facts, were not trying
to conceal their presence. The individuals parked their vehicle in
a proper and conspicuous place, walked on the sidewalk at a normal
pace, and engaged in conversation at a normal voice level. No one
was dodging in and out of dark areas, whispering or parking cars in
a dark or isolated area.
The Court seemed to place emphasis on the fact that someone in
the group said, "that m

f

doesn't know who is he dealing

with11 and the citizen's conclusion that a fight might take place.
The case law is clear that activity that is equally consistent with
legal activity or not peculiar to criminal activity cannot be the
basis of reasonable suspicion. State v. Humphrey. 314 Utah Adv.
Rep. 48 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). There is absolutely no reason to
believe that the statement was addressed to their present activity.
It could have been made about an incident a year ago, last month,
or weeks ago. The citizen heard no response by any of the other
five or six individuals indicating some group rage. There was no
identity of the individual referred to in the statement. The
citizen saw no weapons. Simply, there was no basis or detail that
would support the conclusion that there was going to be a fight.
There is no law against parking where the Defendant parked or
against walking on the sidewalk or making the statement alleged to
have been made. Even if the individuals were going to confront
someone, there is absolutely no basis to conclude that there was
going to be any physical confrontation as opposed to a discussion
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or even quarrel. The facts to that point simply do not evidence any
criminal activity.
In the second phone call, the citizen reports a shot fired
which the police wrongfully interpret as "shots." The individuals
are reported as walking back to the vehicle, not running. The car
leaves at a normal pace and no activity is taken again to elude
observation. In fact, the same statement is heard by the citizens
upon return to the car. Most important, the citizen never claims to
have observed a gun or an actual shot fired. There are innumerable
events

that

may

sound

like

a

shot;

to

wit,

backfire

of

an

automobile, striking of certain objects, household explosions of
materials,

doors

slamming

and the

like. The

citizen

hears

no

yelling, shouting or other signs of a confrontation. The only
significant event from the second call is the unabashed conclusion
of the citizen that he heard a shot. Under the test set out above,
there was simply insufficient detail in the report to support the
conclusion of a shot as opposed to a sound from other sources or
that the Defendant was somehow related to the noise. The citizen
only knew that the sound came from the large area, out of their
view, where the Defendant was walking.
The two conversations, taken together, simply do not establish
a reasonable suspicion that there was criminal activity afoot and
that the Defendant and his companions were associated with it. It
is imperative that the Court separate the factual observations of
the citizen from the unjustified conclusions relied upon by the
officer

and

the trial

court. The
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facts are that

five or

six

individuals exited a properly parked car and traveled on a public
sidewalk at a normal pace, not trying to conceal their presence,
without any observable weapons. One of the individuals makes a
derogatory statement about an undescribed individual or event that
could have happened years ago. A sound is heard that may have come
from a gun or a myriad of other sources. No argument is heard and
there are no sounds consistent with a fight. The individuals walk
normally back to their car again, without attempting to conceal
themselves and leave in a normal manner without undue acceleration.
The facts, without unsubstantiated

conclusions, simply fail to

describe a crime and therefore to provide a basis for a reasonable
suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle.
The evil noted above was specifically identified in the Utah
Court of Appeals analysis of the facts in Case:
If such a factual foundation were not required, it would
be possible to validate bogyig information or secure
action based only on police hunches simply by sending
information through police channels. Such informationlaundering legerdemain is simply not countenanced under
the Fourth Amendment.
(Emphasis added.)
Id- at 29 n. 7.
The logic of the Court of Appeals is clear. An officer upon
seeing an individual cannot stop that individual on the mere hunch
that

the person

may

have violated

the

law. The

officer

must

actually be in a position to conclude reasonably that a public
offense was committed. To do so, the officer must be aware, through
his senses, of facts supporting the conclusion.
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If an officer could stop an individual based only on legal
conclusions of a citizen, without the need of specific need of
factual detail supporting legal conclusion, a large gap would be
created in the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. In
reality, officers would phone in their on nonspecific information,
to justify stops.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FROM THE ILLEGAL
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING.
A.

Summary of the Facts,

The facts reflect that the officers, up to the time that the
vehicle was searched, knew of no other material facts than stated
in the preceding point.
B.
If

the

Law as Applied to the Facts of the Case.
facts

are

insufficient

to

establish

a

reasonable

suspicion for the initial stop as argued above, there clearly is no
probable cause for the search of the vehicle. As noted in State v.
Patefield. 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),
cause

exists

where

the

facts

and

circumstances

"probable

within

the

[officers1] knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed."

(quoting State v. Dor;gey, 731 P. 2d 1085, 1088

(Utah 1986)/ Brineaar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 175-76. Again
probable cause is an objective standard based upon a reasonable
review of the totality of circumstances State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d
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220, 226-7(Utah App. 1995). It is submitted that no probable cause
can be established based upon the information in the possession of
the officers at the time of the stop and search.
Utah law is clear that "warrantless

searches

are

per

se

unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement." State v. Brown. 853 P. 2d 851, 855
(Utah 1992) . The State must demonstrate "that the circumstances of
the seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement."
State v. Stricklina. 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App. 1992); State v,

Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984).
There

is

no

question

that

the vehicle

was

not

searched

incident to an arrest. If a search is conducted incident to an
arrest,

an officer may search the area within the

arrestee's

"immediate control" to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons
or destroying evidence. Chimel vT California, 395 U.S. 752, 763,
766 (1969); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769. 784 (Utah App.) cert.
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The cases clearly establish that
a search incident to arrest is proper only if (1) the arrest is
lawful

(New York V. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458

(1981); State v.

Giron. 320 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); (2) the search
is of the area within the arrestee's immediate control (Chimel v.
California.

supra

at

763; and,

(3)

the

search

is

conducted

contemporaneously to the arrest. Id.
Officer Gordon Christensen clearly and unequivocally testified
that the Defendant and his companions were stopped, ordered from
the vehicle, handcuffed, put in four separate patrol cars and then
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the vehicle was searched. When the officers discovered the
revolver,

the

Defendant

and

his

companions

were

.38

apparently

Mirandized and transported to the Orem Police station, without
being arrested
can

be

no

(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 270-86). There

factual

dispute

that

no

arrest

was

made

that

was

contemporaneous in time and place with the search of the vehicle.
The search cannot be justified based upon the inventory search
exception. For an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle
to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer conducting
the

search

must

follow

standardized

procedures.

Colorado

v.

Bertine. 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987); State v. Giron. 320 Utah Adv.
Rep. 31, 33 (Utah 1997). The officer's search must be in accordance
with a standardized practice of inventory rather the suspicion of
criminal

activity.

South Dakota v. Opperman.

479 U.S. 367.375

(1987) . Here, the evidence is uncontroverted that the officers were
not

conducting

an

inventory,

with

an

inventory

sheet

and

a

standardized practice, but instead, were pursuing the investigation
of criminal activity (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 270-86) .
The State has the burden of introducing

evidence

that

such a

standardized reasonable procedure exists "and that the challenged
police activity was essential in conformance with the procedure."
State v. Strickling. 844 P. 2d 979, 987-88

(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

State v. Giron, supra.
The only other applicable exception is that based upon exigent
circumstances.

Exigent

circumstances

exist

"only

when

the

inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to
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an urgent need for immediate action." United States v. Satterfield,
743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir. 1984). Utah courts have identified
several exigent

circumstances

that may justify a warrantless

search, including the immediate need to prevent harm to the
officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of the suspect. State
v. Ash. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); City of Orem v. Henrie.
868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Belaard. 840 P.2d
816, 823 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Palmer. 803 P.2d 1249, 1252
(Utah App. 1990).
In State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), the Court
concluded that the mere possibility that a suspect may have a
weapon, or that evidence might be destroyed, is insufficient. Id.
As noted in State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985), "once the
threat the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons
or will destroy evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why
the officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant." The Court
specifically noted that under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, no
real impediment would be created for police investigations. Id.
In this case, the Defendant and his companions all exited the
vehicle without confrontation. The Defendant was cooperative and
obeyed the officers. The Defendant and the persons with him were
all handcuffed and placed in police vehicles before the search was
conducted. There was absolutely no reason that the officers could
not apply for a warrant. The facts of this case establish that the
officers transported the Defendant and his companions to the police
station and therefore there was no need to search the vehicle
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before

a

warrant

was

obtained.

Once

the

individuals

were

handcuffed, there was no fear of weapons or the destruction of
evidence and thus, no exigent circumstances to justify the search.
Accordingly, there was not a legal basis to justify the search and
the evidence obtained therefrom must be suppressed.
POINT III: THE ADMISSION OF STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO BEAU
HEAPS WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AND EVIDENCE RELATED TO THE
VIOLENT CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED.
A.

Summary of Facts.

Throughout the trial, the prosecution was allowed to introduce
every aspect of the relationship between the victim John Frietag
and the co-defendant, Beau Heaps, whose trial had been separated
from that of the Defendant. Witnesses were allowed to testify
regarding

Heaps 1

relationship

for years with

the

victim.

The

evidence of that relationship, through the incident in July of
1996,

did

not

involve,

in

any

way,

the

Defendant.

The

tape

recording of the threats made by Heaps to Frietag on the answering
machine was a clearly powerful exhibit. However, there was no
evidence that the Defendant had any relationship with the victim
and certainly no evidence that he was a party or even present when
the voice message was made. All of the evidence relating to the
statements that Heaps had made regarding Frietag simply had no
connection with the Defendant. Only one witness testified to any
conversation between Frietag and the Defendant and that was Tiana
Heard who admitted that she did not hear the conversation and that
the Defendant did not talk to her about any such conversation.
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Counsel

for

the

Defendant

proffered

evidence

from

two

witnesses that the victim experienced violent outrages and periods
on paranoia when he was off medication and was using drugs and
alcohol. The witnesses also were prepared to testify that during
such

periods

the

victim

acted

bizarrely.

The

Defendant

was

precluded from using the fact that the victim was found in women 1 s
underwear,

with

shaved

legs,

dyed

pubic

hair

and

jewelry

to

evidence the fact that he was going through a violent period and
was experiencing paranoia. Additionally, the Defendant was barred
from

using

the

testimony

of

Dr.

Wooten

who

was

extensively

proffered to the court.
B.

The Law Applied to the Facts of the Case.
I.

Admission of Statements Attributed to Heaps

In Bruton v. The United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the trial
court admitted at a joint trial the non-testifying co-defendant's
confession, which

also

incriminated

the defendant

Bruton. The

United State Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had
thereby violated Bruton's constitutional right of confrontation,
even though the jury was instructed to disregard the co-defendant's
confession in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. Id- at 12728. Specifically the United States Supreme Court held that where
there is a substantial risk that the jury in a joint trial will use
extrajudicial statements made by a non-testifying co-defendant to
determine

another

co-defendant's

guilt,

the

admission

of

the

former's confession violates the latter's Sixth Amendment Right to
confrontation. Id.
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To invoke the Bruton doctrine, a statement must be powerfully
and facially incriminating with respect to the other defendant and
must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate the complaining
defendant in the commission of the crime. Richardson v. Marsh, 107
S. Ct. 1702, 1707 (1987); United States v. Jonas, 786 F.2d 1019,
1022 (11th Cir. 1986).
There

is no question that the statements received

in the

present case that were allegedly made by Beau Heaps were in fact
"powerfully

and

facially

incriminating11

of

the

Defendant.

Throughout the trial the State attempted to link the animosity
between Frietag and Heaps to the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court
was compelled to exclude the testimony.
In addition to the mandate in Bruton, Rule 4 03 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
It is submitted that the statements were not relevant to state
of mind, motive or other relevant issue in the case under Rule 4 01
URE.

However, even if relevant, the evidence should have been

excluded under Rule 403.
As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701
P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 1985), "precedent . . .

is of little value" in

reviewing whether a trial court has correctly made the balancing
test required by Rule 403. As mandated by Rule 403 URE, a trial
court must exclude evidence when the potential for unfair prejudice
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of a particular bit of evidence outweighs its probative value.
State

v.

Laffertv.

749

P.2d

1239,

1256

(Utah

1985).

"Unfair

prejudice" has been interpreted by the Utah Appellate Courts as
meaning an "undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." State
v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1991).
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee's
note reads:
. That certain circumstances call for the
exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance.
These circumstances entail risks which range all the way
from inducing decision on a purely emotional basis, at
one extreme, to nothing more harmful than merely wasting
time, at the other extreme.
Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory committee's note, quoted in M. Graham,
Handbook of Federal Evidence, Sec. 403.1, at 178 (2d ed. 1986).
"Unfair prejudice" within the context of Rule 403 means an undue
tendency to suggest a decision on any improper basis. Id. Graham,
explains:
Since all effective evidence is prejudicial in the
sense of being damaging to the party against whom it is
offered, prejudice which calls for exclusion is given a
more specialized meaning: an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly but not
necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, sympathy,
hatred, contempt, retribution or horror. Where a danger
of unfair prejudice is perceived, the degree of likely
prejudice must also be considered. The mere fact that
evidence possesses a tendency to suggest a decision upon
an improper basis does not require exclusion; evidence
may be excluded only if the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the
proffered evidence.
Id. at 182-83.
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Another

commentator

noted

that

Rule

403

is

particularly

relevant when the disputed evidence applies primarily to less than
all of the parties against whom the action involves. Id. at 180. In
summary, courts must be sensitive to any "unfair advantage that
results

from

the

capacity

of

the

evidence

to

persuade

by

illegitimate means." 22 C.Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and
Procedure. Section 5215 at 275 (1978); Carter vf Hewitt, 617 F.2d
961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Burger, Weinstein' s
Evidence. Section 403 [03] at 403-15 to 403-17 (1978).
The courts have found that evidence admitted for the purpose
of evaluating credibility may be intact under Rule 403. United
States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Domingez. 604 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1984).
The following expressions in federal cases illustrate

the

interpretation given in Rule 403 by a number of federal courts:
United States v. Dailleaux. 685 F.2d 1105, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 1982)
(unfair prejudice results from . . . that aspect of the evidence
which makes conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional
response in the jury or otherwise intends to affect adversely the
jury's

attitude

toward

the

defendant

wholly

a part

from

its

judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.);
Carter v. Hewitt. 617 F.2d

961 972-73

(3d Cir. 1980)

unfairly

appeals

the

prejudicial

if

it

to

jury's

("it

is

sympathies,

arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or
otherwise may cause a jury to base its decision on something other
than the established propositions in the case."); United States v.
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McCray. 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979) (the major function of
Rule 403 "is limited to excluding matters of scant or cumulative
probative

force, dragged

in by the heals for the sake of

its

prejudicial effect . . . to permit the trial judge to preserve the
fairness of the proceeding by exclusion despite its relevance.").
An example of the application of Rule 4 03 that is relevant to
these proceedings is found in United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d
218 (1st Cir. 1981). The government in that case sought to admit
into evidence

a tape recording

of a conversation

between

the

defendant and a governmental informant. The apparent purpose of the
informer's telephone call was to obtain an admission from the
defendant that he had participated in criminal conduct

several

months before. Although relevant, the court explained why the tapes
potential

for prejudice

substantially

outweighed

any probative

value:
[T]he overall context of the tape could legitimately
be found prejudicial by virtue of its tendency to suggest
a kind of "guilt by association." The court might
reasonablely have concluded that a jury would ascribe
undue influence to the mere fact that a defendant had a
casual conversation with an admitted criminal, leading to
a conviction based on a generalized assessment of
character. This possibility might be thought particularly
acute where . as herer
Lhs conversation
includes

obscenities, ethnic slurs, and otherwise coarse language
warped and suffused with an aura of nonspecific
criminality
because
of
the
very
medium
of
a
governmentally planned clandestine overhearing. (Emphasis
added).
Id. at 220.
Another helpful case is State v. Barlor. 498 P.2d 1276 (Id.
1972). In that case the defendant was charged with assault with a
deadly weapon, growing out of an altercation he had with the victim
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when he observed him sitting with the defendant's wife in her car.
At trial, the victim was permitted to testify that after the
incident but prior to the trial, the defendant telephoned the
victim and threatened him by saying, "I'll put you in the morgue."
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the conviction because of the
erroneous admission of the telephone call. The Court held that the
statement regarding the morgue did not in itself tend to establish
an intent or state of mind at the time of the commission of the
criminal offense. Id. at 1283. The Court further held that even if
it

could

gleam

some

probative

value

from

the

telephone

conversation, it would be so slight that its admittance into
evidence would not be justified in light of the possible prejudice
to the defendant. See. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah

1983); State v, Troyer, 9io P.2d ii82 (Utah 1995); state v, Albue,
754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988); State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah
1989); State v. Menzies 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).
The

Defendant

respectfully

submits

that

the

statements

allegedly made by Beau Heaps should have been excluded under Rule
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
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II.

Admission of Evidence Relevant to the Violent
Propensities Of the Victim.

Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
(A) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
character or trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same; or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness
of
the
victim
offered
by
the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence
that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character
as a witness, as provided by the Rules 607, 608 and
609.
In interpreting Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the
Utah Supreme Court's prior decisions are instructive. In State v.
Gotschgol, 782 P.2d

459

(Utah 1989),

the trial court

admitted

statements made by the defendant on the day of the murder referring
to a baseball bat as his "attitude adjustor." The Utah Supreme
Court held that the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the crime, an issue that was relevant
to the defendant's claim of self defense. Xd. at 463. The Utah
Supreme Court held that the evidence, if admissible under Rule 404,
must pass scrutiny under Rule 403 URE. Only when the proposed
evidence is found to be admissible under Rules 403 and 404, is the
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evidence properly admitted. £££. State v. Gotschell. supra at 462;
State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1370-71

(Utah 1989); State V.

McCardel, 762 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982).
Infit-.at-.ftv. Albue, 754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme
Court

specifically

outlined

the

admissibility

of

out-of-court

statements made by a homicide victim:
In State v. Wauneka. 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977), following
the reasoning of United States v. Brown. 490 F.2d 758
(D.C. Cir. 1973), we enunciated general rules on the
admissibility of evidence of out-of-court statements made
by a homicide victim who reports threats of death or
serious bodily injury made by the defendant. Wauneka held
that such hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, but
may be admitted under the state-of-mind exception to the
hearsay rule if it is not used to prove the truth of the
matter asserted and if certain other criteria are met,
specifically: (I) the evidence is probative of the
decedent's state of mind at the time of the killing, and
(ii) the decedent's state of mind has already been placed
in issue by defense evidence or argument that the killing
was (a) a suicide, (b) in self-defense, or ( c ) an
accident to which the decedent contributed by acting as
an aggressor. Wauneka also suggested that the evidence
might be admissible if the identity of the killer is at
issue. Id.
Id. at 937.
The Court in State v. Albue. supra held that Rule 803(3) URE
embodies the holding in Wauneka. Rule 803(3) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, provides as follows:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless
it relates to the execution, revocation, identification,
or terms of declarant's will.
There is no question that evidence relating to a propensity
for violence of the victim is admissible under Rule 404(a)(2). The
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Defendant properly raised self defense in the case and the issue of
how the confrontation between the parties developed was central to
the resolution of that issue.
The

Defendant

proffered

that

witnesses

were

prepared

to

testify that Mr. Frietag had been off medication and was acting
bizarrely.

Specifically,

that because

of

a chemical

imbalance

caused by the medication and the use of marijuana and alcohol, he
would dress up like a woman and that his ability to control his
emotions

and

aggressiveness

were

seriously

influenced.

The

Defendant was refused the right to point out to the jury that at
the time of death, Mr. Frietagfs public hair had been dyed, he had
shaved his legs, was wearing women's bikini-thong underwear and
women's

jewelry

indicating that Mr. Frietag was having

mental

difficulties (Tr.1126-28) .
The defense also proffered expert testimony, based upon the
medical

and psychological

engaged

in a life of serious drug and alcohol abuse and that

withdrawal

from

records of Mr. Frietag

those drugs could

that

he had

cause depression, violence,

paranoia and other mental problems (Tr. 1629-58). The trial court's
refusal to admit the evidence was an abuse of discretion (Tr. 1128,
1524-25, 1578-80, 1657-58, Exhibit 47, 48) . There is no question
that the victim had been drinking at the time of the shooting and
had significant prescription and other drugs in his possession.
Evidence relating to the effect of withdrawal from those drugs and
the use of alcohol offered by the Defendant was clearly relevant to

53

the violent propensity of the victim under those circumstances and
should have been admitted.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HOLDING
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS
MIRANDA RIGHTS AND IN ADMITTING THE DEFENDANT'S
CONFESSIONt

A,

Summary of Facts.

The trial court found that officer Downey testified at the
suppression hearing that he read the Defendant his Miranda rights
and pausing, after each right, received an acknowledgment from the
Defendant, Officer Downey testified that the Defendant waived his
Miranda rights and would make a statement in the absence of an
attorney. The Defendant was presented with a form outlining each
right and voluntarily signed the form indicating that he understood
his rights and voluntarily waving the same. At no time did the
Defendant, during the statement indicate that he did not understand
English or wished to discontinue the statement (R. 258-65).
Lois Dettenmaier, who holds a Ph.D in psychology testified for
purposes of

the suppression

hearing

that

she

specialized

in

learning disabilities (Tr. 1017). In that regard, she testified
that she was trained to assess a person's psychological, academic
and intellectual level of function (Tr. 1020-21). Dr. Dettenmaier
testified that she undertook to investigate the Defendant's ability
to understand the Miranda rights admonition form printed in English
(Tr. 1020). The witness reviewed the tape of the confession, the
"admonition

of

rights"

form

signed

by

the

Defendant

and

a

transcript of the statement (Tr. 1020). The doctor administers the
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Wechsler Adult intelligence Scale which indicated the Defendant's
I.Q. to be below average, 86 (Tr. 1021) . The Defendant scored an 87
on the Test for Non-verbal Intelligence (Tr. 1021). The results of
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (in which the subject matches
a written word with one of four pictures illustrating its meaning)
revealed he was at the level of a 4 year and two month old normal
child

(Tr. 1022) .The results of the Woodcock-Johnson

test of

cognitive abilities revealed he was at the level of a 4 year ten
month old child (Tr. 1023). The Defendant's reading comprehension
was tested and revealed a 3.8 grade level and his comprehension at
a second grade level (Tr. 1023) . The doctor testified that the
results were consistent with a learning disability (Tr. 1023, Def.
Suppression Hearing Ex. 1).
The doctor testified that the first one hundred words of the
Miranda rights admonition form signed by the Defendant had a
readability level of between 9th and 10th grade (Tr. 1025) . The
doctor testified that she listened to the tape of the officer's
interview and that the pauses between the rights were inadequate
based upon the Defendant's ability to comprehend and that by the
time the officer got to right number five, the Defendant could not
recall the first right read (Tr. 1026). The doctor testified that
the Defendant would not be able to comprehend the material on the
rights admonition form if he read it (Tr. 1026-27).
The trial court concluded that the Defendant's waiver was
voluntarily and knowingly given. The entire text of the trial
court's Ruling is attached as part of the Addendum (R. 258-65) .
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B.

The Law Applied to the Facts of the Case.

There is no question that prior to a custodial interrogation
of a defendant, he must be advised of his right to remain silent,
the right to have an attorney, the right to appointed counsel in
case of indigency and the right to suspend questioning any time to
invoke the rights to silence or counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S.

436

(1966). The validity of a waiver is determined by the

totality of circumstances Moran v. Burbine. 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986) . The critical issue is whether Lavulavu gave a knowing,
voluntary and an intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Miranda,
supra at 479. The Court must recognize a presumption against a
waiver and the State's burden of establishing a valid waiver.
United States v. Bernard,

795 F.2d

749, 752

(9th Cir.

1986),

Mirandai supra at 475.
The trial court, in its Ruling embodied the ruling in People
v. Cheatham, 551 N.W.2d 355

(Mich. 1996) . The Defendant submits

that Cheatham is far form dispositive and clearly distinguishable
from the facts of this case.
First, Cheatham is not binding upon this Court. The opinion is
from the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan and, as such, may
support a binding or persuasive decision but has no weight at all
for the case being considered by this Court. Defendant submits as
persuasive authority the case of Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d
305,

(10th Cir. 1967). In that case, the Court of Appeals held as

follows:
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. . . Miranda is not a ritual of words to be recited by
rote according to didactic niceties. What Miranda
does
require
is meaningful
advice
to the unlettered
and
unlearned
in language which he can comprehend and on
which he can knowingly act . . . The crucial test is
whether the words in the context used, considering the
age, background and intelligence of the individual being
interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of
all of his rights.
Coyote, 380 F.2d at 308; (Emphasis added) . See also Green v. United
States, 386 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1967).
The Tenth Circuit has taken a more recent look at the Miranda
issue specifically regarding police interrogation of a non-English
speaking suspect in United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493 (10th
Cir. 1996) . In Hernandez, the Court reiterated traditional Miranda
language.
To establish a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, the
government must show (1) that the waiver was voluntary in
the sense that it was a product of free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception;
and (2) that the waiver was made in full awareness of the
nature of the right being waived and the consequences of
waiving. Only of the totality
of the
circumstances
surrounding
the interrogation
shows both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite
level of comprehension can a
waiver be
effective.
Hernandez, 93 F.3d at 1501. (Emphasis added).
The Hernandez court held that "a translation of a suspect's
Miranda rights need not be perfect if the defendant understands
that he or she need not speak to the police, that any statement
made may be used against him or her, that he or she has a right to
an attorney, and that an attorney will be appointed if he or she
cannot afford one." Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1501. The import of the
Hernandez decision is that the suspect received the Miranda warning
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in Spanish but the interpreter did not give a literal translation.
Rather

he

interpreter

gave
was

one
not

with
well

poor

grammatical

trained.

However,

content
the

and

the

defendant

had

completed one year of college and was Spanish-speaking receiving a
Spanish admonition of rights. The Court held that perfection was
not required if the substance of the warning was conveyed. In this
case, no effort was made to Mirandize in Lavulavu's language. In
this case there was no substance conveyed. The expert testimony-which was uncontroverted--clearly indicated that the wording of the
rights was at a 9th to 10th grade level and that the Defendant was
at

a

3rd

to

4th

grade

level

and

simply

was

incapable

of

understanding the admonition. Based upon Hernandez and Coyote, both
persuasive decisions, the admonition in this case was defective and
Lavulavu's statements must be suppressed.
Second, Cheatham is clearly distinguishable. In Cheatham, the
defendant had an IQ of 62 but spoke English as a primary language.
At the time of Miranda questioning, defendant was advised twice of
his rights and gave two separate statements. At a suppression
hearing,

a

defense

psychologist

offered

an

opinion

that

the

defendant knew he didn't have to talk with police. Police officers
testified that they read Miranda rights to the defendant, then
during the second interview a second officer asked the defendant if
he could read before they offered the rights admonition form to him
to review. Upon learning the defendant could not read, the second
officer read the rights admonition form a second time, pausing
after each right to explain if necessary and to have defendant
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place his initials next to each right to signify understanding and
waiver.
Contrary to Cheatham, in the case at hand, Lavulavu was the
last of seven defendants interviewed. Police knew Lavulavu was
Tongan, as were five of the six co-defendants. Police knew Lavulavu
had only been in the country slightly more than a year. Police
never inquired whether Lavulavu needed translation assistance. They
read the rights quickly and secured an oral waiver then directed
Lavulavu where to sign the form. Police never inquired whether
Lavulavu could read at all and more specifically whether he could
read English. The psychologist

in the case gave a clear and

unequivocal opinion that Lavulavu could not and did not understand
that oral presentation of the rights waiver form and furthermore,
Lavulavu could not and did not understand the form itself when
presented with it to read and sign.
Finally, the analysis in Cheatham supports Lavulavu's argument
that suppression is the only appropriate outcome in light of the
facts of this case. The Defendant
Cheatham

should

not

respectfully

even be considered

since

submits that
it

is neither

persuasive nor controlling but makes the following argument as a
concession to the State's argument before the trial court. Cheatham
adopts a two-prong approach, recognizing and incorporating a review
of police action and review of the knowing and intelligent nature
of a defendant's waiver. See Cheatham 551 N.W.2d at 365. The Court
in Cheatham concluded that the confession at issue was voluntary
and went on to review the knowing voluntary waiver. In the case at
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hand, Lavulavu submits as a preliminary matter that any admission
was not voluntary. Testimony adduced at the suppression hearing
clearly set out the coercive elements. Defendant was arrested at
approximately 1:10 a.m. on a Sunday morning. He was taken to the
Orem

Department

of

Public

Safety

where

he

was

held

until

interrogated at approximately 6:50 a.m. He was not offered language
assistance even though police officers were aware he was a Tongan
national and had resided in this country only slightly more than a
year.

Police officers took advantage of Defendant's

language

disability in an effort to obtain a confession and without regard
to their responsibilities to safeguard Defendant's constitution
rights. Certainly, the police action was negligent at a minimum.
See Cheatham 551 N.W.2d at 363. (The deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged
in willfully, or at the very least negligent conduct which has
deprived the Defendant of his rights. By refusing to admit evidence
gained as a result of such conduct, the court hopes to instill in
those particular officers, or in their future counterparts, a
greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused).
A simple inquiry of a foreign national as to whether he needs
language

assistance

and an inquiry of anyone

handed

written

material whether he can read and more specifically read English
should be a prerequisite to any responsible interview unless it is
the desire of the police agency to take advantage of an alleged
suspectf s minority and language status. The absence of such inquiry
is clear negligence and renders any admission involuntary.
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Furthermore, Lavulavu was "directed" to sign the waiver, not
requested as the police would have the Court believe. Detective
Downey testified he read Lavulavu's rights to him. After all the
rights had been read, he queried whether Lavulavu understood his
rights to silence and to an attorney, then handed the form to
Officer Barry Nielsen, a uniformed officer, with the direction.
"Have him sign it here." Officer Nielsen pointed to a line where
Lavulavu signed as directed. Such a circumstance is not voluntary,
but coercive.
Of course, if the Court finds that the waiver was not
voluntary, the inquiry is over and any statements made should be
suppressed. If the Court determines the waiver was voluntary, the
second

prong

involves

a determination

of

the

knowledge

and

intelligence with which the waiver was given, a subjective analysis
directed at the suspect's understanding and analyzed in light of
the totality of the circumstances.
The totality of the circumstances approach "permits--indeed,
it mandates--inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. This includes evaluation of the suspect's age,
experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into
whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him,
the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
those rights." Id. Dr. Lois Dettenmaier, the only expert presenting
testimony, after examining the factors noted above determined that
the Defendant could neither understand the rights when read to him
nor could he understand the form when presented to him to read
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himself.

Moreover,

Lavulavu

could

not

understand

abstract

terms contained within the rights waiver

individual
form. She

testified he could not even sound out coerce or threaten and when
challenged

to

find

an

opposite

(a

method

of

determining

understanding) of silence he could not offer one. She testified
there was one word he could find an opposite for. To Leikina
Lavulavu, the opposite of "right" was "left!"
Consequently, Dr. Dettenmaier concluded that Lavulavu lacked
the capacity

to understand and therefore, unless unusual steps were

taken, he could not understand. Testimony from both Detective
Downey and Officer Nielsen confirm no special efforts were taken to
compensate for the language or comprehension difficulties.
Lavulavu was not offered an interpreter; Lavulavu was not
asked if he could read English; the Miranda rights were read to him
in rapid succession; there was no attempt made to explain. The
totality

of

the

circumstances

clearly

show

that

Lavulavufs

statements were not the product of knowing an intelligent waiver
and therefore, inadmissible.
POINT V: THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE JURY'S VERDICT
This Court, in evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the trial court's verdict. State v. Vigh.
supra? State V. BQQker, SUEra; State v. Lemons, supra. Verdicts are
reversed only where reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
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was convicted. State v. Viah. suc^a; State V. LemQIl/ supra; State
v. Johnson. supx^.
The Defendant was convicted of Manslaughter in a School Zone,
which requires a finding that the Defendant recklessly caused the
death of Mr. Frietag or knowingly or intentionally caused his death
under circumstances where the defendant reasonably believed the
circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his
conduct

although

the

conduct

was

not

legally

justifiable

or

excusable (R. 453, 412).
The evidence in the case establishes that the Defendant did
not

really know Mr. Frietag.

It was Beau Heaps

that

had

the

relationship with Mr. Frietag and his stepdaughter Susan Rice. The
relationship between Frietag and Heaps was well documented during
the trial. It is clear that the friction between Heaps and Frietag
occurred when Mr. Frietag was away in July 1996 and his front door
was broken during a party at which Heaps and not the Defendant was
present. If fact prior to the phone calls to Mr. Frietag within
days of the shooting, there was no connection between the Defendant
and the victim.
As it relates to the telephone calls, Ms. Heard's testimony is
ambiguous at best. Only in the Defendant's statement is there an
acknowledgment that the Defendant spoke to Mr. Frietag and during
that conversation, Mr. Frietag told him to watch his back.
The testimony regarding the Defendant's prior use of the gun
to shoot at parked cars after a party by an individual clearly
biased and drunk at the time was rebutted by the other passengers
63

in the car and officers who testified that no shootings at the time
and place had been reported.
On the night of the shooting, the Defendant was not an active
participant in the events leading up to the trip to the Frietag
residence or in trying to get the other defendants to participate.
When the Defendant and his companions arrived at the Frietag
residence, there is no dispute that Mr. Frietag had opened the door
and was talking to one of the persons accompanying the Defendant to
the scene. There is no question that something was observed in the
hand of Mr. Frietag. It was in response to that observation, that
the shots were fired. There is no question that .22 shells were
found

at

the

scene

but

no

gun

was

located.

There

were

irregularities in the police log as to person entering and exiting
the Frietag residence after the shooting and Nancy Bollschweiler,
who was romantically involved with Mr. Frietag and had a key to his
apartment, was left alone in the apartment with the victim for a
period of time. It simply makes no sense for Mr. Frietag to have
the shells to a gun in his hand and no gun. The evidence suggests
that Mr. Frietag had bragged about luring Heaps and his friend to
the house and the reference to a bulletproof vest suggests that he
was prepared for that encounter. The only reasonable conclusion is
that in fact, Mr. Frietag had a gun that the companions of the
Defendant observed and caused them to react.
The Defendant and his companions testified that Mr. Frietag
had a gun and that it was in response to that gun that the shots
were fired. Under those circumstances, the Defendant had the right
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to defend himself and others and use deadly

force. At that

juncture, the Defendant did not provoke the action, was not the
aggressor and was not engaged in the commission of a felony.
(R. 445). Only one shot was fired and that was in close proximity
to the observation of the gun in Frietag's hand and the fear that
Mr. Frietag was going to shoot. Mr. Frietag could have avoided the
encounter almost at every juncture by not answering the door,
closing the door after seeing the individuals and importantly, not
holding a deadly weapon in his hand. The reasonable view of the
evidence as marshaled herein in the Statement of Facts demonstrates
that the Defendant had the right to defend himself in light of Mr.
Frietagfs actions.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse
the verdict, judgment and sentence in this case and remand the
matter with directions as to the admissibility of evidence and the
statement of the Defendant as argued herein.
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Exhibit 1 -- Utah Code Annotated 76-3-203.2
(supp.1996)

76-3-203.2

CRIMINAL CODE

(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16,
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-101801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19.
Money Laundering and Currency Transaction Reporting
Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section
76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but
provides an enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties
under this section that the persons with whom the actor is
alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser
offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall
decide whether to impose the enhanced penalty under
this section. The imposition of the penalty is contingent
upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this section is
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall
enter written findings of fact concerning the applicability
of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of
the sentence required under this section if the court:
fa) finds that the interests of justice would be best
served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the record and in writing.
ISM
76-3-203.2. Definitions — Use of firearm in offenses
c o m m i t t e d o n or about school p r e m i s e s —
Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) "On or about school premises" as used in this section
and Section 76-10-505.5 means any of the following:
(i) in a public or private elementary, secondary, or
on the grounds of any of those schools;
\ii) in a public or private vocational school or
postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions;
(iiij in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (l)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility; and
r
v) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (l)(a)(i), (ii), (iii),
and viv).
(
h) As used in this section:
(i) "Educator" means any person who is employed
by a public school district and who is required to hold
a certificate issued by the State Board of Education in
order to perform duties of employment.
(ii) "Within the course of employment" means that
an educator is providing services or engaging in
conduct required by the educator** employer to perform the duties of employment.
i2) Any person who, on or about school premises, commits
*inv offense and uses or threatens to use a firearm in his
possession in toe commission of the offense is subject to an
enhanced degree of offense as provided in Subsection (4).
(3) (a) Any person who commits an offense against an
educator when the educator is acting within the course of
employment is subject to an enhanced de«p"#v» of offense as
provided in Subsection (4).
(b> As used in Subsection (3>(a), "offense* means an
offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against The
Person; and

(c) an offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, j Q |
bery.
(4) The enhanced degree of offense for offenses comiatffl
under this section are:
(a) if the offense is otherwise a class B misdemeanor
is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) if the offense is otherwise a class A misdemeandQI
is a third degree felony;
(c) if the offense is otherwise a third degree felony tffr
a second degree felony; or
(d) if the offense is otherwise a second degree felony it
is a first degree felony.
(5) The enhanced penalty for a first degree felony offensatf
a convicted person:
(a) shall be imprisonment for a term of not less than
five years and which may be for life, and imposition's
execution of the sentence may not be suspended u n W
the court finds that the interests of justice would be b i t
served and states the specific circumstances justifying t&r
disposition on the record; and
(b) shall be subject also to the firearm enhancement
provided in Section 76-3-203 except for an offense con?
mitted under Subsection (3) that does not involve.*'
firearm.
(6) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indict^
ment is returned, shall provide notice upon the informs?
tion or indictment that the defendant is subject to the
enhanced degree of offense or penalty under Subsection1
(4) or (5). The notice shall be in a clause separate from sad
in addition to the substantive offense charged.
(b) If the notice is not included initially, the court may"
subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging
documents to include the notice if the court finds the'
charging document, including any statement of probable
cause, provide notice to the defendant of the allegation he
committed the offense on or about school premises, or if
the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been
substantially prejudiced by the omission.
(7) In cases where an offense is enhanced by a degree
pursuant to Subsection (4Xa), (b), (c), or (d), or under Subsection (5Xa) for an offense committed under Subsection (2) that
does not involve a firearm, the convicted person shall not be
subject also to the firearm enhancement contained in Section
76-3-203.
1*4
76-3-203.3. P e n a l t y for h a t e c r i m e s — Civil rights violation.
As used in this section:
(1) "Prima rv offense" means those offenses provided in
Subsection (5).
(2) A person who commits any primary offense with the
intent to intimidate or terrorize another person or with*
reason to believe that his action would intimidate or
terrorize that person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) "Intimidate or terrorize" means an act which causes
the person to fear for his physical safety or damages the
property of that person or another. The act must be
accompanied with the intent to cause a person to fear to
freely exercise or enjoy any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the state or by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.
(4) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an
indictment is returned, shall provide notice on the
complaint in misdemeanor cases that the defendant
is subject to a third degree felony provided under thit
section. The notice .shall he in a clause separate fron
and in addition to the substantive offense charged.
(b* If the notice is not included initially, the cour
may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend th»
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Exhibit 2 -- Trial Court's Ruling on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress

Fouri! j-;aicia District "Court
of Utan bounty, State of Utah
CARMA =
i > SMITH, Clerk
"' LiA
Deputy
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURr
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
CASE NO. 961401295

vs.

DATE: November 26, 1996
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING

LEIKINA LAVULAVU,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and in opposition
to the Motion, the Court denies the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision
and Order.

Statement of Facts
1.

On August 25, 1996 at approximately i :06am, Orem dispatch received a call from a

citizen who reported five or six dark complected males had parked a white sedan in front of
his house at 395 E. 400 N. Orem, and were "bailing out." Based on their manner and the
conversation he overheard, the citizen was afraid there was going to be a fight.
2.

Approximately two minutes later, another call was received from the same residence

indicating shots had been fired. While on the line with dispatch, the caller saw the males get
back in the car and leave westbound on 400 North. The caller reported that another person at
the house had heard the males say "That mother fucker doesn't know who he's dealing with"
prior to getting back into the vehicle.
3.

Officers were given as a description of the vehicle and the passengers, a "white

passenger car" carrying five or six "dark-skinned males."

•c.
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4.

Officer Barry Nielsen was northbound on State Street, south of 400 North. He saw

a car come from 400 North and turn northbound on State Street. He could not identify if the
vehicle matched the description given by dispatch, so he followed it on State Street. When
he passed 400 North, he looked eastbound and saw only one pair of headlights travelling
westbound on 400 North towards State Street.
5.

As Officer Nielsen approached the vehicle northbound on State Street, he observed

that it was a dark colored passenger car. In his rearview mirror, he saw the other car
westbound on 400 North turn south on State Street and observed that it was a white passenger
car. He turned his vehicle around and followed the car now southbound on State Street.
6.

Officer Nielsen continued to follow the white car as it turned westbound on Center

Street. Prior to reaching 400 West, he was able to determine that there were several male
occupants in the vehicle . He and other officers initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle at the
intersection of Center Street and 400 West.
7.

The officers removed the occupants of the vehicle and placed them in handcuffs.

The occupants were informed that an individual had been shot in the area they had just left
and a car matching the description of their car was scene driving away.
8.

Officers Gordon Christensen and Eric Beveridge searched the vehicle and located a

.38 caliber revolver from under the drivers' seat, which was where the Defendant was sitting
when the vehicle was stopped. The officers also located a steak knife, tire iron, and BB gun
in the vehicle.
9.

The seven occupants of the vehicle were taken to the Orem Police Department

where they were read their Miranda rights and questioned by Officer Gary Downey.
10.

Prior to questioning the Defendant, Officer Downey read him his Miranda rights,

pausing after each right and receiving acknowledgement from the Defendant before
proceeding. The Defendant said he would waive his Miranda rights and make a statement to
the police in the absence of an attorney. The Defendant was presented with a form outlining
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each right and voluntarily signed the form, indicating he understood his rights and was
voluntarily waiving them
11.

Officer Downey then interviewed the Defendant and, pursuant to the Defendant's

consent, an audio tape of the interview was made. At no time during the interview did the
Defendant indicate that he did not understand English or that he did not want to proceed with
questioning in the absence of an attorney

Opinion of the Court
I.

THE OFFICERS HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO
JUSTIFY STOPPING THE VEHICLE CONTAINING THE DEFENDANT.
The Orem police offers' stop of the vehicle containing the Defendant is a level two

stop as described by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Deitman, 739 P 2d 616, 617-618
(Utah 1987) By initiating the traffic stop, the officers temporarily restrained the Defendants
using a show of authority. A level two stop, and subsequent seizure of a person requires the
seizing officer to have an "articulable suspicion" that the person being seized has committed,
is committing, or will commit a crime. Id Whether an officer's basis for a seizure
constitutes a reasonable or articulable suspicion is "determined by the totality of the
circumstances in light of the officer's experience and training." State v Dorsev. 731 P.2d
1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)
After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of the
Defendant's vehicle, as well as the information available to the officers, the Court finds that
the officers did have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the Defendant had committed a
crime Orem dispatch received a call from a citizen saying a white car with five or six dark
complected males had stopped in front of their house and based on the hour, and conversation
the individuals were having, they suspected a crime would be committed. Within two
minutes of this first call the citizen heard shots fired, saw the individuals return to their car,
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and heard one of them say "That mother fucker doesn't know who he's dealing with " These
facts taken together create a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed and that
the individuals in the car are connected with the crime
The officers gained visual contact with the Defendant's vehicle shortly after
receiving the call from the citizen

Officer Nielsen testified that as he pursued the other

vehicle coming from 400 North, the Defendant's vehicle was the only other car coming from
the suspect vehicle's last reported direction on 400 North

As soon as Officer Nielsen realized

the vehicle he was pursuing did not match the description of the suspect vehicle, he turned
around and had visual contact with the Defendant's vehicle from the time it turned from 400
North onto State Street until it was stopped at 400 West and Center Street

The officers knew

that this was the vehicle they were looking for because they had a physical description of the
vehicle and its occupants from the citizen informant. Even though they did not personally
receive the information from the citizen, information told to one officer is presumed to be
available to all officers.
In considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of the
Defendant's vehicle the Court considers the following: the close proximity in time of the
calls received from the citizen informant and the officers' visual contact with the suspect
vehicle, the physical description of the vehicle and its occupants, and the lack of any other
traffic coming from the scene of the crime. Considered together and in light of the officers'
training and experience, the Court finds the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant's vehicle and temporarily detain the occupants.

II

THE OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
WAS CONSTITUTIONAL.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) acknowledged that a

cursory search of a person without a warrant was within the parameters of the Constitution if
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the purpose of the search is to look for weapons. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the Terry "stop and frisk" to include the search of
the passenger compartment of the defendant's car even though the defendant did not have
access to the car while the officers were talking to him.
In this case, the officers were justified in searching both the occupants of the vehicle
as well as the vehicle when they had only a reasonable suspicion that the occupants had
committed a crime. The search of the Defendant's vehicle was not overly intrusive and the
officers testified that the purpose of the search was for weapons because they were concerned
for their safety. Such a concern is reasonable considering the crime the officers were
attempting to investigate when they stopped the car was a shooting. The fact that the
occupants were all handcuffed and had no access to the passenger compartment of the vehicle
is not dispositive in light of Long.

I

The Court finds that the officers' warrantless search of the vehicle was within the
scope of the Constitution and evidence obtained pursuant to the search is admissible at trial.

ID.

I
THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD AND WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
In determining whether a criminal defendant properly waived his Miranda rights, the

Court must consider if the "'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension." People v. Cheatham.
551 N.W. 2d 355, 361 (Mich. 1996) (quoting Moran v Burbine. 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
In addressing the first prong of this test, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that "absent
coercion, a confession could not be involuntary, and that a deficiency in the defendant that is
not exploited by the police cannot vitiate the voluntariness of the confession." J& at 362
(quoting Colorado v Connelly. 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986)).
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In the case before the Court, the Defendant has not brought forth any evidence that
the waiver of his Miranda rights or subsequent confession were coerced. Therefore, the Court
finds that the first prong of the test is met and the Defendant's waiver was voluntary.
The second prong of the Court's inquiry involves whether the Defendant's waiver
was knowingly made. The Defendant claims that because he cannot read or write English,
the waiver he signed was not knowingly made. However, it is not necessary for the
Defendant to read, understand and sign a form such as the one provided to the Defendant by
Officer Downey in order for Miranda rights to be properly given and waived. The form
Officer Downey had the Defendant sign is merely a further assurance that the Defendant was
informed of his rights and waived them.
Officer Downey testified that he informed the Defendant of each right, including the
right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present, the right to have the Court
appoint an attorney if he cannot afford one, and the admonition that any statements the
Defendant makes will be used as evidence against him in court. Officer Downey also
testified that he received acknowledgement from the Defendant after reading each of these
rights. At this point, Officer Downey has fulfilled all of the constitutional and statutory
requirements in allaying the inherent coercion the U.S. Supreme Court found inherent in
custodial interrogation when it decided Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Court finds unpersuasive the Defendant's argument in the alternative that he
could not comprehend spoken English enough to understand his rights as Officer Downey
read them to him. The Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Cheatham, a case similar to
the one now before the Court, stated that to "knowingly waive Miranda rights, a suspect need
not understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or exercise the rights
that the police have properly explained to him." 551 N.W. 2d 355, 367(1996).

All that is

required is that the defendant "know of his available options before deciding what he thinks
best suits his particular situation." Id,

6

-Or 026

In support of his argument, the Defendant offered the testimony of Dr Dettenmaier,
who stated that when she tested him on his knowledge of the words contained in the Miranda
warning, he could not provide responses which she thought indicated understanding of the
meaning of the words However, Dr Dettenmaier's tests did not attempt to determine the
Defendant's understanding of the Miranda warning, only the words contained in the warning
The Court thinks it is self-evident that the particular words in the warning gain much of their
meaning in relation to the other words in the warning and in the context of the warning itself
In addition, Dr Dettenmaier testified that repetition of words increased the
Defendant's comprehension of their meaning In today's society, it is unlikely that any
individual who has watched television will not have at least heard the language of the
Miranda warning a number of times, so engrained in our society is the particular phraseology
of the warning In addition, the Court notes that the Defendant is no stranger to the criminal
justice system

The Court thinks it is likely the Defendant had heard the Miranda warning

prior to his interview with Officer Downey

Relying on the testimony of Dr Dettenmaier that

repetition increases comprehension, the Court finds that the Defendant had the requisite
understanding of the Miranda warning to reach the threshold requirement of knowing what
options are available to him before waiving the rights contained in the warning
Other than Dr Dettenmaier's testimony, the Defendant offers no other evidence that
he does not speak or understand English In the absence of any other evidence and after
listening to the tape of the Defendant's confession, in which his responses to Officer
Downey's questions were topical and responsive, the Court concludes that the Defendant did
have a significant enough grasp of the English language to understand the warning given to
him The Court also finds no indications of lack of comprehension of English that would
have alerted Officer Downey that the Defendant would only understand the warning if it were
delivered in Tongan
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Having considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
and the Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights, as required by the U S Supreme Court m
North Carolina v Butler 441 U S 369 (1979), the Court finds that the Defendant voluntarily
and knowingly waived his Miranda rights Therefore, his confession is admissible and will
not be suppressed at trial

Order
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is herby denied
DATED this 27th day of November, 1996
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